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NEEDED REFORMS IN THE HARMONIZATION 
OF U.S. PATENT LAW
It is a great pleasure to have this opportunity to discuss the significant area 
of intellectual property. The time allotted to me is brief so my remarks 
must be limited. What I shall attempt to do is to identify major areas
where, in my judgment, intellectual property 
laws need change, or at least attention. Please 
remember that I speak as an economist, not as 
a lawyer, and my comments will reflect that fo-
cus on the general economic role of intellectual 
property, not on the particulars of any case. 
Specifically, emphasis shall be on the role of in-
tellectual property in the stimulation and com-
mercialization of agricultural biotechnology 
products and changes which would (could) en-
hance that stimulative effect.
In particular, I shall comment on the following 
topics:
—imports of “products-by-process,”
—broad protection for pioneering inventions 
and the rush to invent,
—the U.S. first-to-invent system and interna-
tional harmonization,
—clarification of the experimental exception from infringement, and 
—implications of revisions to the International Union for the Protection 
of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV).
Those who follow these matters will recognize that my comments are 
directed principally to patents and related forms of intellectual property 
rights, not to copyrights and trademarks. That seems appropriate as pat-
ents are the most suitable form of protection for the types of products rep-
resented at this meeting. Before discussing patents in some detail, it may 
be helpful for those in the audience whose only direct contact with patents 
is the notice on a can opener reading “patent pending” (incidentally a legal
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status in the U.S. which has no real significance whatever), to give some 
broad overview of what intellectual property is and how the laws function.
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
Intellectual property refers to creations of the mind—inventions, music, 
books, etc. Such things require special attention because, unlike other 
more tangible forms of property, they have a “common good” attribute— 
“consumption” by another person does not directly diminish the amount 
available. We can all sing a hit song without its availability to anyone being 
reduced. Clearly we cannot all drive the same car or live in the same house 
without someone being disadvantaged.
Common property is one of the theoretical (and practical) justifica-
tions for government involvement. National defense is a common prop-
erty good provided by governments and so is agricultural research like 
plant breeding which worldwide is and remains largely government 
funded1. The private sector can involve itself, but the catch is no profits 
can be claimed. If everyone can sing my song free of charge, I would have 
little economic incentive to be a composer/lyricist. At best I would be a 
part time one, working the remaining time to support my song writing 
“hobby.”
At this point, intellectual property comes in, providing an incentive for 
private entities to engage in creative activities. This is done by providing 
the creator/inventor, the holder of the right, with the option of prohibit-
ing others from using his/her creation. In parallel with the right we have of 
excluding others from using our private real property. From this perspec-
tive two major conclusions can be drawn about intellectual property:
—its intent is economic, the provision of a monetary incentive to attract
private investment to creative endeavors,* 2 and 
—it works by exclusion, the ability to prohibit others from using one’s
invention.
Intellectual property law then allows a limited (in scope), temporary (for a 
specified period) monopoly right over inventions. Of course, there is little
Intellectual 
property laws 
are a form of 
economic in-
centive which 
operate 
through the 
ability to ex-
clude others.
' For a further explanation of these issues see any text on public finance econom-
ics, eg., Herber, 1975.
'Another approach to intellectual property is that of inherent rights-an inventor 
should have the exclusive right to use his or her invention. That approach is not 
treated here in favor of the economic incentive concept.
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real benefit in simply excluding others, so permission is generally given for 
compensation—the royalty payment.
Intellectual property laws then are a form of economic incentive which 
operate through the ability to exclude others. The legislation says nothing 
about one’s freedom to use the invention. That right might be limited by 
regulation (as described in the preceding paper by Robert B. Nicholas), by 
a related, prior grant of protection, or by other means. Nor does the grant 
of protection say anything about the practical significance of the inven- 
tion/creation. It is not, nor could it be, the responsibility of government 
employees in, say, the Patent Office to predict the economic viability of an 
invention. That decision is made by the market. The inventor has the op-
portunity to profit from the invention, but no guarantee. Indeed, only 
something like 20-30 percent of patents are ever commercialized and few 
of these are really lucrative. Moreover, it is the responsibility of the holder 
of the right to enforce it. We do not have a police force for infringers; 
rights must be protected through court proceedings initiated by the in-
volved parties.
This all says intellectual property is less than many assume it to be. It 
is important, but generally not that important. Referring again to patents, 
businesses often rank patents low on lists of decisions on where/how to 
invest in research and development (surveys in Scherer, 1980, p. 446; 
Nogues, 1990, pp. 11-14). But note that where it is ranked high is for phar-
maceutical products and living organisms, which are easily copied. As 
these products are the underpinning of much of the biotechnology indus-
try, that sector is especially concerned with the form and operation of in-
tellectual property protection.
Since intellectual property laws serve as an economic policy tool, a de-
vice to spur private research and development spending, it would be satis-
fying to know how well this policy works. Regrettably that question can-
not be answered with any real clarity. We have some evidence that such 
laws do spur investment (Butler & Marion, 1983). What is lacking is evi-
dence that existing laws are anywhere near optimal in terms of scope or 
length of protection (see the literature review by Braga in Siebeck, 1990). 
This is an important issue because intellectual property laws consist of 
many detailed aspects for which we have little economic evidence to guide 
us. Many of my comments below deal with such aspects, but recognize
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there is no firm evidence to point to in support of one position or the 
other.
Since intellectual property comes in numerous forms—music, inven-
tions, books, computer programs, data bases, etc.—several laws are re-
quired to cover this breadth. The major of these, and the principal creative 
areas they apply to, are as follows, recognizing that any terse list like this 
does grave injustice to the nuances of these issues:
Patents', inventions for products and processes (a special form for selected 
plants is known as Plant Breeders’ Rights);
Copyright: books, music, recordings, computer programs;
Trademark: product names and other identifiers;
Trade secrets: anything of economic value which is actively kept from the 
public.
The first three of these have their separate requirements and functions, 
but those details exceed our scope at this point. The fourth category, trade 
secrets, acts fundamentally differently, for it relies on secrecy rather than 
disclosure. It is also perpetual, so long as the secret can be maintained (as 
with the formula for Coca Cola syrup). But perhaps most significantly 
trade secrets in the U.S. are based on state rather than national law and 
hence protection is more variable. Contracts often substantiate the basis 
for this protection or extend it into other realms.
When considering the overall protection allowed by intellectual prop-
erty laws it is important to recognize that they are often used jointly. For 
example, technologies can be licensed with a patent licensing agreement 
for the base technology accompanied by trade secrets (possibly involving 
non-disclosure agreement) providing some “tricks of the trade” of the 
most efficient use of that technology. Thus intellectual property protec-
tion involves a range of types of laws. Adding to that the difficulty of en-
forcement in some instances, the determination of the actual degree of 
protection for a particular product/technology in a specific country is in-
deed a complex matter.
That said, the U.S. has the broadest protection available in the world. 
The breadth applies particularly to higher plants and animals where pat-
enting is a matter of policy and practice. Contrast that with the European 
Community which is still struggling with the patentability of these prod-
ucts (see the OECD Directive, 1988) although progress is now being made.
...the U.S. has 
the broadest 
protection 
available in 
the world.
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biotechnology.
In fact let me make the broad statement, without much specific substantia-
tion, that limitations to intellectual property protection in the U.S. has not 
been a major factor in delaying private research and development invest-
ment here in biotechnology. Those who are looking for a major source of 
the problem will have to look elsewhere, in my judgment. This of course 
does not say everything is fine in this area. Let us now look at where im-
provements seem to be needed.
IMPORTS OF PRODUCTS-BY-PROCESS
For many years, U.S. inventors lacked effective protection for products pro-
duced overseas by a technology patented in the U.S. The rights granted 
read as follows (35 U.S.C. Sec. 271—Infringement of Patent):"...Whoever 
without authority makes, uses or sells any patented invention, within the 
United States during the term of the patent....” Clearly, as the use of the 
technology did not occur in the U.S. there is no violation of this statute. 
Contrast this position with the rights specifically granted in many coun-
tries. The European Patent Convention for example reads in Article 64 (2), 
“If the subject-matter of the European patent is a process, the protection 
enforced by the patent shall extend to the products directly obtained by 
such a process.” Protection for U.S. inventors, however, exists outside the 
patent act —specifically in the 1988 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness 
Act (Biotechnology Newsletter, Nov. 1988).3 That Act purposely avoids the 
term “directly obtained”, substituting two provisions delineating when in-
fringement has not occurred:
1- [the product] is materially changed by a subsequent process, or
2- [the product] becomes a trivial and nonessential component of another 
product.
While these matters may seem esoteric, they have a direct bearing on 
agrobiotechnology. For example, as Bent, et.al. (1987, pp. 320-22) discuss, 
how are the products of a potential breeding process or gene insertion sys-
tem to be interpreted? The first generation (the direct product) using these 
technologies would almost certainly be covered. But what of succeeding 
products or generations which are the creation of the patented technology
3An earlier version, the Tariff Act of 1930 in Section 337 did grant similar 
protection, but its breadth raises problems, especially with GATT (see Barton, 
1989).
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but did not directly employ it? In the U.S. this matter can be partially 
avoided by claiming the propagation method, but that necessitates identi-
fying all the possible products of the invention. In Europe the ban on the 
protection of the products of “essentially biological processes” (EPC Ar-
ticle 53 (b)) prevents that approach.
The matter is a complex one for limiting protection to only the direct 
products likely gives too limited protection. The extension to all future 
generations, however, gives a potentially enormous scope, something that 
clouds the ownership of many living organisms. That extent of protection 
seems excessive and will in some cases chill further research. The normal 
pattern is for case law to resolve these matters, but that is a slow and im-
precise method. It is better to write the legislation more specifically to 
identify, for example, how many generations are to be covered in a prod- 
uct-by-process claim. My preference for the U.S. is to place such legisla-
tion within the Patent Act.
However, the 
purpose of 
intellectual 
property is not 
equity to the 
creator, it is 
the social good 
to which these 
laws are 
directed.
BROAD PATENT PROTECTION FOR PIONEERING INVENTIONS
If my preceding comment could be broadly supported, this one will be far 
more controversial. It has to do with the essentially “defensive” position 
from which U.S. patent examiners operate. In brief, they must grant the 
claims made by the inventor unless specific reasons (evidence) for denying 
them can be established. The evidence required is prior knowledge or 
prior inventions. Inventors in new, pioneering endeavors will typically 
claim broadly, and the very newness of the field means examiners have no 
basis for denying those claims. A key example is that of the “Harvard 
mouse”—the one and only higher animal patent to date—which claims 
“A[ny] transgenic non-human mammal....” (claim #1, U.S. Patent No. 
4,736,866).
At one level this sort of broad claim granting seems equitable—some-
thing pioneering, after all,, deserves a greater reward. However, the pur-
pose of intellectual property is not equity to the creator, it is the social 
good to which these laws are directed. Society benefits by bringing forth 
an invention at the least cost, that is, by granting the smallest degree of 
monopoly rights needed to induce an invention. From what we know 
about fundamental inventions, they are inspired by some form of creative 
drive, not solely by financial motives. Patents seem best suited to stimulate
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the repetitive work required to refine inventions and make small ongoing 
improvements (Scherer, 1980; Jewkes, etal., 1969). Therefore it is not clear 
if society is receiving a proper return for the broad protection granted.
This matter touches on two issues of patent law and patent economies 
known as the rush to invent and undue experimentation. The rush-to-in- 
vent analysis recognizes that the patent system grants great benefits to the 
successful—the first—and little to others (but see comments under the 
first-to-invent system below). This in turn can stimulate hurried, dupli-
cated research by multiple firms, a social waste. Secondly, firms fearing 
they are late entrants may desist from entering altogether. Counterbalanc-
ing these, the race tends to bring forth inventions more rapidly than oth-
erwise, a societal gain. It has not been possible to determine theoretically 
or empirically where the balance lies (Siebeck, 1990; Scherer 1980, Chap.
15; Dasgupta and Stiglitz, 1980). The granting of large value to pioneering 
inventions however exacerbates these issues although again the societal 
outcome is not clear.
“Undue experimentation” is a patent term which says in essence that 
the invention must be replicable in some reasonable time or economic 
frame (see Van Horn, 1987). It provides a way that examiners can limit a 
patent scope by requiring proof of duplicability. This issue for example 
might arise in the “Harvard Mouse” patent where all non-human mam-
mals are claimed, but to date (to my knowledge) only a mouse has actually 
been produced. Can indeed the procedure be extended to primates with-
out undue experimentation? This matter will likely be reviewed in appeal 
or in the courts in the future.
If the theoretical issue is not clear, the practical considerations are be-
coming so. Without attempting to comment on the merits of any particu-
lar patent, broad legal battles are emerging now in the area of agricultural 
biotechnology. This is particularly true for broad claims to a method of 
achieving some goal, that is to say to a claim to the dominance of a tech-
nology or procedure. It is not clear, at least to me, that society benefits 
from such broad grants. What it may lose are the costs of the litigation 
along with the chilling effect such unclear rights have on related research. 
Narrower but clearer protection would seem to be preferable in business 
planning to broad but fuzzy protection. I call for a reform in Patent and 
Trademark Office practices in this area.
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THE U.S. FIRST-TO-INVENT SYSTEM
One of the steps in awarding a patent is determining who is the inventor. 
Most of the world follows a simple system—the first to file is presumed to 
be the inventor (the first-to-file system). The U.S. is nearly alone in grant-
ing patents to the first-to-invent- an extreme that allows a transfer of the 
patent even after it has been granted. The process followed is one of inter-
ferences (35 U.S.C. Sec. 135). Considerable documentation, including de-
tailed, dated lab roles, is required to substantiate the date of invention.
Conceptually and theoretically speaking, the first-to-invent system is 
preferable. It awards the patent to the true inventor and reduces some of 
the pressure for the race to invent, mentioned above. Moreover, the first - 
to-file system combined with a grace period (the time prior to the first 
patent application) allows some opportunity for a strategic revealing of 
the invention to foreclose rights to others (Lesser, 1987).
That said, the first-to-invent system, too, raises problems, the greatest 
of which is protracted court battles. One was recently concluded in favor 
of Amgen over ownership of the patent for recombinant erythropoietin 
(EPO) (Nature 350 (i99i):99; Biotechnology 9(i99i):327). Moreover the 
documentation process is unfair to foreign inventors as certain lab docu-
ments must be certified in the U.S. and burdensome to small inventors. It 
is, in my judgment, time for the U.S. to abandon our first-to-invent system 
and join the rest of the world.
CLARIFICATION OF THE EXPERIMENTAL EXEMPTION 
It is not necessary to convince agricultural researchers of the need for ac-
cess to prior developments—patented or not—as part of the continuum 
of developmental work. To this group the words of the Patent Act (35 
U.S.C. sec. 271) “.. .whoever without authority makes, uses or sells...” is 
indeed chilling. What will their access be to patented plants and animals? 
This issue of the so called research exemption is a key one, in perception if 
not reality.
As the research exemption is not specified in U.S. patent law, it is open 
to interpretation. Here there is widespread disagreement due to the opin-
ion in Roche Products v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co. (Fed. Cir., 1984). How-
ever, the particular case, which as a precursor to marketing a generic drug 
had clear and specific commercial intentions, did not apply to experimen-
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tal use so that some consider the extensive and often quoted commentary 
as not dicta—that is not applicable in other instances.41 agree with Bent 
(1989) in the regard that not allowing experimental use flies in the face of 
the evolutionary nature of inventions and the whole purpose of the patent 
system. Nevertheless that belief/interpretation is not widely held; many 
are concerned by this issue.
The concern has arisen in the proposed (but not enacted) amendment 
to the Patent Act (the Transgenic Animal Patent Reform Act). A1989 
workshop sponsored by the Crop Science Society of America similarly rec-
ommended a clarification of this matter, through legislation if need be 
(American Society of Agronomy, 1989, pp. 186-87).
There is an urgent need to clarify this matter to researchers if not in the 
law. Legitimate concerns exist and need to be addressed.
REVISIONS TO UPOV
UPOV is the international convention for Plant Breeders’ Rights (PBR). 
PBR are patent-like grants with some additional exemptions (especially 
the right of farmers to plant seed held over from harvest) which reduces 
the scope of protection compared to patents. In the U.S., UPOV is imple-
mented as the Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970.
UPOV is significant here because in Europe, and where European-type 
law is applied, it acts as a “separate but equal” system where UPOV covers 
plants and patents other inventions. This is done through the ban on so- 
called double protection (UPOV Article 2) from which the U.S. has an ex-
emption.
The point of raising this is to note that major revisions have been pro-
posed and are being discussed at this time (UPOV 1990). Like many 
changes, this revision promises benefits as well as possible problems for 
U.S. agricultural biotechnology firms. Among the major benefits, the ban 
on double protection is proposed to be dropped, facilitating the way for 
the much needed patenting of plants in Europe.5 Of possible concern is 
the institution of dependency rights (Article 14 ^-Alternative A). De-
4The case identified in Roche Products was rectified by a 1984 amendment to the 
U.S. Patent Act (Sec. 271(e)) giving specific rights for testing pharmaceutical 
products.
’Other approaches to this end are being taken currently-see Council Direc-
tive (OECD, 1988).
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pendency rights define the opportunity for the developer of the “initial” 
variety to authorize or not the sale, offering for sale, etc., of “essentially 
derived varieties.” That latter term refers to changes which preserve the 
essential characteristics of the variety, such as variety selection, back- 
crossing or transformation by genetic engineering. Varieties are not to be 
sequentially dependent (A-B-C), but rather dependent on the initial vari-
ety (A). My concern is that the holder of the rights to “A” will gain quasi-
intellectual property rights to the thousands of attributes of the variety 
which he/she did nothing to create. It is just this potential co-opting for 
individuals of plants in the public domain which is so feared and criticized 
by breeders and others.
At the same time, proposed rights extend only to the “products made 
directly from harvested material” (Article 14 (1)—Alternative A). One can 
imagine that the breeder of a new maize variety would be powerless to 
prevent the importation of foodstuffs using corn starch made from that 
variety. Thus the proposed revisions, at least in one alternative, appear to 
provide too much protection in one respect and too little in another. Yet 
until such time as the patenting of all plants is widely granted around the 
world, UPOV will remain the available form of protection for U.S. inven-
tors in this sector. Close attention to these changes and their effects is 
needed immediately. This is not an abstract exercise that is underway.
CONCLUSIONS
My attempt has been to establish the state of intellectual property protec-
tion in the U.S., and especially that for agricultural biotechnology, as be-
ing quite extensive. Its shortcomings, in my view, are not principally re-
sponsible for slow commercialization of these products. That point aside, 
intellectual property legislation is evolving also and I have identified sev-
eral areas where, in my opinion, further attention needs to be directed to 
achieve a better balance between private incentive and public well-being.
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